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CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion 
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1 Summary of findings 
    Chapter 2 revealed that higher neuroticism predicted lower cardiovascular 
response, lower HPA axis response, a stronger decline of positive affect and a 
weaker control-feeling during the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). Higher 
extraversion was associated with less cortisol activation and a slower increase 
in negative affect during the TSST. Higher scores on openness were – like 
higher extraversion –also associated with a lower cortisol stress response. 
These results showed that the different personality traits were associated with 
differences in several aspects of individual stress responses. 
    In Chapter 3, we found that the number of life event exposure during the 
past 12 months was associated with a blunted heart rate and a lower heart rate 
variability (HRV) reactivity to the TSST after controlling for individual differences 
in neuroticism. Furthermore, the group with low executive control (higher false 
alarm rate in the Go/No-Go task) showed a significant association between 
higher recent life stress and blunted acute stress response, which was not 
apparent in the group with high executive control (lower false alarm rate in the 
Go/No-Go task). These results suggested that greater executive control may 
benefit us with adaptive acute stress responses under recent life stress. 
    Chapter 4 integrated fMRI studies in a meta-analysis of reward processing 
under acute stress, showing that acute stress enhanced reward anticipation, 
the motivation/incentive component of reward, in the bilateral putamen, 
whereas reward consumption, the pleasure of getting a reward, was decreased 
under acute stress in the dorsal striatum and right thalamus. These findings 
have important implications for understanding real-world reward-related 
behavior in stressful environments. 
    Chapter 5 examined the relationship between trait motivation and time-
money tradeoff choices. It showed that individuals with higher trait motivation 
had a greater propensity to choose an immediate small reward over a more 
‘rational but delayed’ reward, which was modulated by the functional coupling 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) with the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC). These results suggested that intrinsic organization within the 
prefrontal cortex plays a key role in linking achievement motivation and reward 
discounting behavior. 
    In the following, I will discuss potentially unifying neurobiological and 
psychological mechanisms that may underlie individual differences in acute 
stress responses and the interaction between stress and reward processing. 
2 Possible mechanisms underlying individual differences in 
acute stress responses 
Chapter 2 revealed that neuroticism was the strongest predictor of blunted 
cortisol response to TSST among the five personality factors. Neuroticism is a 
general risk factor associated with many forms of psychopathology, such as 
anxiety and depression (Kotov et al. 2010) which were also found associated 
with an altered HPA response to acute stress (Fiksdal et al. 2019; Zorn et al. 
2017). However, the underlying mechanisms have not been fully elucidated yet. 
Based on previous studies, I discuss plausible psychological and neural 
mechanisms for altered acute stress responses from three angles: emotion 
processing and amygdala, cognitive control and prefrontal cortex, and the 
reward-motivation dopamine system (see also Figure 1).  
2.1 Altered emotion processing and amygdala function  
Personality refers to a stable pattern of behavior and emotional responses. 
The particular way a person perceives a situation determines how he or she 
would cope with it behaviorally and physiologically (McEwen 1998). Altered 
emotion processing is one of the core symptoms in a number of personality 
disorders and has been associated with increased rates of transdiagnostic 
psychopathology. For instance, greater emotion responses pre-exposure to 
stressful military service were associated with increased levels of stress 
disorder symptoms post-exposure (Admon et al. 2013). Neuroticism is 
generally characterized by altered emotion processing (for a review, Servaas et 
al. 2013). For example, it is associated with self-reported difficulties regulating 
emotions (Paulus et al. 2016) as well as with problematic coping strategies 
such as  wishful thinking, withdrawal, and emotion-focused coping (Connor-
Smith and Flachsbart 2007; Ormel et al. 2013). Evidence from brain imaging 
studies corroborate these findings. One electroencephalography (EEG) study 
reported that neurotic individuals appraise unknown information as more 
negative, as indexed by a greater feedback related negativity (ERN) to 
uncertainty than to positive stimuli (Hirsh and Inzlicht 2008). A systematic 
review with fMRI studies showed that activity in the amygdala, a key hub for 
emotion processing in the brain (for a review, Phelps and LeDoux 2005), was 
associated with higher cortisol responses both during and shortly after acute 
stress (Harrewijn et al. 2020). Moreover, high-neurotic individuals showed 
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enhanced amygdala reactivity to acute stress (Everaerd et al. 2015). 
Given the evidence of altered emotion processing and increased amygdala 
reactivity to aversive stimuli in high neurotic individuals, the blunted 
cardiovascular and cortisol stress response in high neuroticism as we observed 
in Chapter 2 may be a reflection of vulnerability to the development of affective 
disorders. However, it should be noted that neuroticism is a multi-faceted, 
complex construct comprising anxiety, depression, self-consciousness, 
impulsivity and hostility (Weiss and Costa 2005). Thus, further studies are 
needed to know which specific dimensions of neuroticism play a key role in 
stress vulnerability. 
2.2 Altered cognitive control and frontal cortex  
Cognitive control has been proposed to underlie the ability of emotion 
regulation (Ochsner et al. 2012; Joormann and Tanovic 2015). Revealing the 
complexity of this relationship, all aspects of cognitive control, including 
updating (constant monitoring and rapid addition/deletion of working memory 
contents), shifting (switching flexibly between tasks or mental sets) and 
inhibition (deliberate overriding of dominant or prepotent responses) (Miyake 
and Friedman 2012), are associated with different components of emotion 
processing. For example, updating ability was found to moderate the effect of 
reappraisal and rumination on negative stimuli (Joormann and Tanovic 2015), 
indicating that cognitive control influences stress responses indirectly. This was 
supported by the study in Chapter 3, where we found a moderating role of 
cognitive control in the relationship between life event frequency in the last 12 
months and cardiovascular response to TSST. Specifically, the association 
between higher exposure to life events and blunted acute stress response was 
not apparent in the high inhibitory control group. As one dimension of cognitive 
control, inhibition was considered as the capacity to override an initially 
dominant response, whereas inhibition deficiency is associated with impairment 
in disengaging from negative emotions (Joormann and Tanovic 2015). 
Alterations in cognitive control of emotion were also observed in individuals of 
high neuroticism. Specifically, trait neuroticism was associated with decreased 
function connectivity between anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and amygdala 
(Cremers et al. 2010) and with a failure in top-down control and regulation of 
emotion in the neurocircuitry of amygdala-ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) connectivity (Silverman et al. 2019). Further, neuroticism was related 
to increased activation in brain regions of frontal and cingulate areas involved in 
the processing and regulation of emotion, possibly suggesting a need for 
greater regulatory efforts in order to gain cognitive control over negative 
emotions (for a review, Servaas et al. 2013). In addition, HRV was recently 
proposed as a biomarker of top-down self-regulation of behavioral, cognitive, 
and emotional processes (for a review, Holzman and Bridgett 2017), but 
reduced high-frequency HRV during cognitive reappraisal of negative stimuli 
was observed in high neuroticism (Di Simplicio et al. 2012). Though the 
specific-focused study on the cognitive control and acute stress response is 
still scarce, this evidence suggests that greater executive control may be 
beneficial in terms of a more adaptive response to acute stress. Investigating 
cognitive control in different groups with different stress responses in future 
research will provide important insights into the potential determinants which 
make a person able to cope with, recover from, and develop resilience to 
stress. 
2.3 Altered motivation-reward processing and dopamine activity  
In addition to the well-known stress hormone cortisol, we also described 
how dopamine reacts to acute stress dynamically in the Introduction section. 
Dopamine is typically considered the core modulator of the reward-motivation 
system in both monkeys and humans (Schultz 2015). Recently, an alternative 
fresh perspective was raised that dopamine plays a general role in dynamically 
estimating of whether or not to expend a limited internal resource, such as 
energy, attention, or time (Berke 2018;  Westbrook et al. 2020). Taken 
together, the dopamine system may be as important as the HPA axis in 
individual responses to acute stress. Specifically, cortisol seems to prepare the 
body for a response to acute stress, whereas the dopamine response may be a 
compensative preparation of the mind in terms of a decision process of how to 
cope with a given stress situation. Though the exact relationship between 
dopamine and cortisol in one’s response to acute stress is not fully understood 
in humans, there is evidence that the two systems dynamically interact with 
one another. One study observed a positive association between cortisol levels 
to psychological stress and amphetamine-induced dopamine release in the 
striatum (Wand et al. 2007).  Another study reviewed that reward deficiency 
paralleled blunted reactivity to acute stress (Carroll et al. 2017). Moreover, 
reward and stress processing share the same brain circuit of frontal-limbic 
areas, which are concerned with both motivated behavior and autonomic 
regulation. Thus, individuals with a less efficient dopaminergic system may also 
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be characterized by a less efficient response to acute stress. 
Elliot and colleagues theorized that the fundamentally central constructs of 
personality are two latent factors labeled as approach and avoidance 
temperament, with neuroticism loading on avoidance temperament (Elliot and 
Thrash 2010). However, it was found that subjects with a high avoidance 
tendency show less neural activity than those with a high approach tendency 
during reward processing in the ventral striatum (Simon et al. 2010), which was 
also evidenced by our results in Chapter 5 that high motivated individuals 
valued reward much more than time (immediate versus delayed reward) in their 
decision making. Therefore, being loaded on avoidance temperament, 
neuroticism may be related to a less efficient reward-motivation system. In light 
of this, the blunted acute stress response in high neuroticism that we observed 
in Chapter 2 probably signified a lower willingness to make effort in a 
demanding situation. In addition, the experience of life-threatening events was 
also associated with increased avoidance motivation (Van Dijk et al. 2013), 
which may partially explain why a high frequency of stressful events was linked 
with a blunted response to acute stress in Chapter 3. Combining the possible 
role of dopamine with acute stress response - a mental preparation for one’s 
response, we speculate that the blunted acute stress response in individuals 
with high neuroticism and/or those with frequent exposure to stressful life 
events may be a manifest that the person was not primarily motivated to 
engage in self-protection but rather tried to avoid or withdraw in a stressful 
situation. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In sum, individual differences in acute stress responses are linked to 
several factors, but their underlying common source from a biological 
perspective is still unclear. We conclude that altered acute stress responses 
may be associated with hampered emotion processing related to higher 
amygdala reactivity, a weaker cognition and emotion regulation in frontal 
cortex, and an inefficient reward-motivation processing with dopamine activity 
related to active coping. Though we discussed these three possible 
mechanisms separately above, in reality they are interrelated structurally and 
functionally. As proposed graphically in Figure 1, an integrated model may 
facilitate identifying individual differences in stress vulnerability and resilience. 
 
Figure 1. The possible information-processing variables affecting individual 
differences in acute stress responses. 
 
The three factors in the model adjust behavior through interaction with 
each other. For example, greater prefrontal executive control facilitates emotion 
regulation through reappraisal (Scult et al. 2017), whereas emotion and 
motivation determine the affective significance of an event, which impacts 
attentional and effortful functions and further alters behavioral performance 
(Taylor et al. 2004; Pessoa 2009; Padmala et al. 2011). In fact, deficits in these 
three facets are found concurrently in many mental disorders such as 
depression (Joormann and Michael Vanderlind 2014; Grahek et al. 2019) and 
schizophrenia (Barch 2005). Further, the three factors also interact strongly at 
the brain structure and function level. For example, DTI and neurotransmitter 
studies showed that the prefrontal cortex (deemed as the “cognitive brain”) 
communicates with subcortical key regions for emotion and reward processing 
via axonal and neurotransmitter projection to (or from) these regions (Arco and 
Mora 2009; Pessoa 2017). Moreover, prefrontal brain regions, such as lateral 
prefrontal cortex (LPFC), are involved in several functional networks 
simultaneously featuring a high degree of connectivity (functional hubs), which 
are critical for regulating the flow and integration of cognition, motivation and 
emotion (for a review, Pessoa 2008). Lastly and foremostly, the stress response 
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is a dynamic process. When unexpected events occur, one’s emotional 
response to the individually perceived salience significance of the (potentially 
threatening) event may be generated in the amygdala. This may activate the 
motivation-reward dopamine system, which may then drive the individual to be 
proactive by prioritizing the reallocation of available resources to the stressor, 
or to react passively with autonomic but no overt behavioral responses. At the 
same time, a more flexible cognitive and emotional regulation capacity benefits 
individuals by continually updating the perceived affective significance, 
selecting appropriate strategies and speeding up recovery from the stressful 
experience. Thus, it is proposed that these factors jointly determine how a 
person perceives, copes with and recovers from a stressor. 
 
3 The dissociative effect of acute stress on reward anticipation 
and reward consumption 
Our findings in Chapter 4 showed that activity in the bilateral putamen 
during reward anticipation was greater in acute stress than in a neutral control 
situation, and that the dorsal striatum and right thalamus exhibited decreased 
activity during reward consumption under acute stress. We here discuss the 
mechanisms underlying the interaction between acute stress and reward 
processing more extensively. 
The observed dissociation between reward anticipation and reward 
consumption is consistent with previous findings indicating a dissociation 
between the anticipation versus the consumption phase of reward processing 
at both the behavioral and the neural level. For instance, it was observed that 
participants mobilized more effort to choose reward cues in a Pavlovian-
Instrumental transfer test in stressful versus neutral conditions, but they did not 
report the reward as being more pleasurable (Pool et al. 2015a). A previous 
fMRI study found that stress increased striatal and amygdala activation during 
reward anticipation but decreased striatal activation during reward 
consumption (Kumar et al. 2014). Regarding increased neural activation during 
reward anticipation under acute stress, a traditional explanation of the buffering 
effect is that reward pursuing could buffer stress-triggered aversive feelings 
with the hedonic pleasure of reward. A recent explanation by Pool et al. 
(2015b) proposed that stress-induced wanting is driven by habits and 
Pavlovian motivational bursts, but not the possible buffering effect of reward. 
Combined with reduced reward consumption under acute stress observed in 
Chapter 4, we consider the second explanation as more probable.  
 
4 Different effects on reward processing from acute stress and 
allostatic load 
In contrast to acute stress, chronic stress or stress-induced mental 
disorders seems to be linked to blunted activation during both reward 
anticipation and consumption, such as major depressive disorder (Smoski et al. 
2009; Olino et al. 2011). An explanation could be that acute stress is a short-
term state with temporal changes in emotions, behaviors, and molecular 
signaling, whereas chronic stress or stress-related disorders are long-term 
conditions that may result in maladaptive behavioral disposition and biological 
changes. For healthy individuals, sufficient physiological and psychological 
responses to acute stress, such as the increased neural activation during 
reward anticipation under acute stress, are indices that the body is able to 
exert an intuitive effort to defend against the aversive situation. In contrast, 
individuals experiencing chronic stress may have limited resources to cope with 
the stress due to chemical changes in the brain resulting from long-term stress 
exposure. For example, studies showed that chronic stress causes HPA axis 
dysregulation, reduces dopaminergic transmission in the prefrontal cortex 
(Mizoguchi et al. 2008) and impairs prefrontal cortex structure and function 
(Mika et al. 2012; de Araújo Costa Folha et al. 2017). 
Overall, our results from Chapter 4 suggest that reward anticipation and 
reward consumption are two distinct processes that are associated with 
different neural responses under acute stress. Further, they suggest blunted 
neural responses during reward processing during stress as a vulnerability 
factor for the development of stress-induced disorders. 
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5 Methodological considerations and future research 
5.1 Stress stages: reactivity, recovery and aftermath of stress 
It is important to note that the stress response is a multi-stage process, as 
diverse molecular signals are dynamically triggered during different stages of 
the stress response (Hermans et al. 2014). This difference in neurobiology of 
discrete stress stages was found to exert different effects on behavior and 
cognition. For example, we observed decreased neural activation during 
reward consumption during stress reactivity (= immediately after an acute 
stressor) in Chapter 4, whereas van Leeuwen et al. (2019) reported an 
increased neural responses to reward consumption in a task performed 50 min 
after stress exposure. In line with this temporal difference, a further study 
reported lower rejection rates of ambiguous unfair offers 75 min later versus 
immediately after the stressor (Vinkers et al. 2013).  
Recent studies have begun to account for the distinct stages of stress 
processing by dividing the stress response pathway into three stages of stress 
reactivity: reactivity to acute stress, recovery from the stress experience, and 
the aftermath (long-term effects) of acute stress. In light of these stages, 
studies using repeated stress induction (e.g., unpredictive electrical shocks at 
any time during a task) can be considered to investigate stress reactivity, 
whereas studies conducting tasks immediately after a stressor may cover both 
the reactivity and recovery stage, depending on the duration of the respective 
task. One study divided these two stages using the mean peak of cortisol 
response as a cut-off, which occurred at about 15 min after stress onset (Finch 
et al. 2019), another study used a more elaborated cutoff based on individual 
peak value to differentiate between stress reactivity and stress recovery 
(Fiksdal et al. 2019). Regarding the aftermath of stress, tasks were started at 
50 min and 75 min after stress in some studies (van Leeuwen et al. 2019; 
Vinkers et al. 2013).  
This new development to consider separate stress response stages 
provides a promising approach for a more thorough understanding of the 
difference mechanisms underlying and moderating individual stress responses. 
How fast people recover from acute stress, for instance, may be an important 
aspect of stress resilience, independent from one’s immediate stress reactivity. 
One study showed that higher emotional intelligence is positively related to 
faster recovery from acute stress, but was not related with stress reactivity (Lea 
et al. 2019). However, most studies did not consider different stress stages as 
an influential factor that needs to be controlled, which may be due to 
insufficient measurements or the resulting higher complexity in statistical 
methods. To better understand the dynamics of how acute stress influences 
cognition and behavior, it is recommended that future studies extend 
measurements, observing longer periods after stress induction, ideally 
measuring stress reactivity, stress recovery, and the aftermath stage 
separately. 
5.2 Cortisol responders and non-responders (high-responders and low-
responders) 
The concepts in the field of stress as described in the Introduction were 
mostly defined from a qualitative perspective, such as uncertain, imbalance 
and cumulative prediction error. However, whether a stress induction is in force 
may need additional objective markers of stress responses, especially 
increases in cortisol levels. To validate that stress was successfully induced, 
two different approaches were used in previous study: One kind of studies 
categorized participants into cortisol responders (peak minus baseline cortisol, 
e.g., >1.5nmol/l or 2.5nmol/l, or > an increased percentage of 15.5%) versus 
non-responders (below the thresholds above) with an exact cutoff threshold of 
cortisol reactivity (Miller et al. 2013; Walter et al. 2018). The other kind of 
studies, as the present Chapter 2 and 3, did not classify responders or non-
responders but considered a group averaged cortisol response as validated 
stress induction. The classifying method has the advantage that it dissociates 
potentially heterogeneous groups and potentially provides more information, 
however, it is a posterior category per se and therefore a somewhat arbitrary 
distinction. From a methodological perspective, the second way may be more 
appliable in healthy individuals as it is normal for a large sample to have a 
continuous distribution from very small to strong cortisol responses (after 
removing outliers). We prefer reporting results from both approaches to show 
more comprehensive findings in the future.  
5.3 Ecological measure of stress  
The physical and psychological data collected five minutes pre-TSST in the 
laboratory was used as baseline in our design in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Though this is a generally used method, an ecologically valid baseline 
measurement would provide better accuracy. It may be more natural and 
elaborated to assess individuals’ stress experiences with a longitudinal 
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approach such as the economic momentary assessment (EMA) approach 
(Bolger et al. 2003). For example, we could measure participants’ heart rate 
and perceived stress severity three times daily for one week before the 
experiment day through portable heart rate monitor and smartphones, and to 
then use these data as an individual baseline. Likewise, continuing to collect 
data for several days after the acute stress manipulation would extend our 
understanding about the period of time individuals need to overcome certain 
stressors.  
6 Conclusion 
This thesis investigated individual differences in acute stress and the 
neural interactions among acute stress, reward processing and motivation. We 
showed that personality traits, stressful life experiences and cognitive capability 
influence the intensity of individual acute stress responses. In addition, we 
found neural reward processing to be linked to intrinsic motivation and this 
relationship to be moderated by acute stress. Future investigation of the 
relationships between various phenotypic predictors of individual responses to 
acute stress will further help to elucidate the fundamental biological 
mechanisms that determine individual stress vulnerability and resilience. This 
will ultimately guide efforts towards prevention and treatment of stress 
disorders.  
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